Evidence, Miracles, and the Existence of Jesus by Law, Stephen
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 28 Issue 2 Article 1 
4-1-2011 
Evidence, Miracles, and the Existence of Jesus 
Stephen Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Law, Stephen (2011) "Evidence, Miracles, and the Existence of Jesus," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 28 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol28/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 28 No. 2 April 2011 129
All rights reserved
EVIDENCE, MIRACLES,  
AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS
Stephen Law
The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to 
place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testa-
ment documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical 
figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most 
popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims 
made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either sin-
gly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a 
prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed—
a principle I call the contamination principle—entails that, given the large pro-
portion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testa-
ment documents, we should, in the absence of good independent evidence 
for an historical Jesus, remain sceptical about his existence.
Introduction
Historians regularly distinguish two kinds of claims about Jesus:
(i) claims concerning Jesus’ existence and the non-miraculous events 
in his life, such as his teaching and crucifixion.
(ii) claims concerning Jesus’ divinity and the miraculous—such as 
walking on water, raising the dead and, most notably, the resur-
rection.
Philosophical reflection has made contributions regarding how we assess 
evidence for the latter—Hume’s writing on miracles being perhaps the 
most noteworthy. Here, I explain how philosophical reflection might also 
make an important contribution regarding how we assess evidence for 
the former.
The focus of this paper is solely on what history, as a discipline, is able 
to reveal. Perhaps historical investigation is not the only way in which we 
might come to know whether or not Jesus existed. Alvin Plantinga sug-
gests that the truth of scripture can be known non-inferentially, by the op-
eration of a sensus divinitatis.1 Here we are concerned only with what might 
be established by the evidence. The key question I address is: is it true that, 
1See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 6.
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as most Biblical historians believe, the available historical evidence places 
Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt? In particular, can we firmly es-
tablish Jesus’ existence just by appeal to the New Testament documents?
Sources of Evidence
What constitutes the pool of evidence on which we might draw in making 
a case for an historical Jesus? The main source is the New Testament, and 
more specifically:
(i) The Gospels, some written within a few (perhaps one or two) de-
cades of Jesus’ death (though probably not by first-hand witness-
es).
(ii) The writings of Paul—written perhaps within a decade or two of 
Jesus’ life. Paul may have known some of those who knew Jesus 
personally. Paul claims to have received the Gospel not from any 
human source or teaching but by revelation from the miraculously 
risen Christ (Galatians 1:11–12, 15–16).
In addition to the textual evidence provided by the New Testament, we 
possess some non-canonical gospels, and also a handful of later, non-
Christian references to Jesus: most notably Tacitus, who writes about the 
Christians persecuted by Nero, who were named after their leader Chris-
tus who suffered the “extreme penalty” under Tiberius,2 and Josephus, 
who makes a brief reference to the crucifixion of Jesus.3 However, it is 
controversial whether these later references are genuinely independent of 
Christian sources (Tacitus may only be reporting the existence of Chris-
tians and what they believed, and Josephus may be relying on Christian 
reports of what occurred.)4 There is also debate over the extent to which 
the Josephus text has been tampered with by later Christians.5
The Consensus View
Historians disagree over the extent to which claims about Jesus’ miracu-
lous nature—and, in particular, his resurrection—are supported by the 
historical evidence. However, when we turn to the question of whether 
there was an historical Jesus, we find a clear consensus emerges. The vast 
majority believe that Jesus’ existence and crucifixion, at least, are firmly 
established (one rare exception being Robert M. Price).6
2See Tacitus, Annals 15.44.
3See Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews 18.63–64 and also 20.9.
4For example, G. J. Goldberg argues that Josephus’s report is based on Luke. G. J. Gold-
berg, “The Coincidences of the Emmaus Narrative of Luke and the Testimonium of Jose-
phus,” The Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 13 (1995): 59–77.
5For examples of those questioning the authenticity of the Josephus text, see Jesus by C. 
Guignebert (University Books, New York, 1956) and Ken Olson’s “Eusebius and the Testimo-
nium Flavianum,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 61 (1999): 305–322.
6See Robert M. Price, The Incredible Shrinking Son of Man (Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus, 
2003).
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Of course, it’s widely acknowledged that the evidence for Jesus’ exis-
tence might seem somewhat limited compared to, say, the evidence we 
have for the existence of individuals from more recent history. But, when 
it comes to figures from ancient history, the evidence is often rather re-
stricted. That doesn’t prevent historians from building a good case for 
their existence.
In fact, it is often said that there is as much evidence for an historical 
Jesus as there is for the existence of a great many other historical figures 
whose existence is never seriously doubted. In A Marginal Jew—Rethink-
ing The Historical Jesus, for example, John Meier notes that what we know 
about Alexander the Great could fit on a few sheets of paper, yet no one 
doubts that Alexander existed.7 Greco-Roman historian Michael Grant ar-
gues that
if we apply to the New Testament, as we should, the same sort of criteria as 
we should apply to other ancient writings containing historical material, we 
can no more reject Jesus’ existence than we can reject the existence of a mass 
of pagan personages whose reality as historical figures is never questioned.8
Biblical historian E. P. Sanders writes:
There are no substantial doubts about the general course of Jesus’ life: when 
and where he lived, approximately when and where he died, and the sort of 
thing that he did during his public activity.9
According to New Testament scholar Luke Johnson,
Even the most critical historian can confidently assert that a Jew named Je-
sus worked as a teacher and wonder-worker in Palestine during the reign of 
Tiberius, was executed by crucifixion under the prefect Pontius Pilate and 
continued to have followers after his death.10
My concern here is with the claim that there is, indeed, historical evidence 
sufficient firmly to establish the existence of Jesus. Note that while I ques-
tion whether there is, in fact, such historical evidence, I do not argue that 
we are justified in supposing that Jesus is an entirely mythical figure (I 
remain no less sceptical about that claim).
Miracles
One difference between the historical claims made about Jesus and those 
made about other historical characters such as Alexander the Great is the 
large number of supernatural miracles in which Jesus is alleged to have 
been involved. By supernatural miracles I mean miracles involving a sus-
pension of the laws or regularities otherwise governing that natural world 
7John Meier, A Marginal Jew—Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Volume 1 (New York: Dou-
bleday, 1991), 23.
8Michael Grant, Jesus, An Historian’s Review of the Gospels (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1977), 199–200.
9E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: Penguin, 1993), 10.
10Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1996), 123.
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(henceforth, I shall simply refer to such events as “miracles”). Walking on 
water, bringing dead people back to life and turning water into wine all 
appear to be miracles of this sort.
This is not to say that miracles were not also associated with other fig-
ures whose existence is not seriously questioned—they were. Attributing 
miracles to major figures, including even sporting heroes, was not uncom-
mon in the ancient world. However, when we look at the textual evidence 
for an historical Jesus provided by the New Testament, we find an abun-
dance of miracle claims. Somewhere in the region of thirty-five miracles 
are attributed to Jesus in the New Testament. These miracles constitute a 
significant part of the narrative. It is estimated that the episodes reported 
by the Gospels (other than the nativity) occur in only the last three years 
of Jesus’ life, and that together they comprise just a few weeks or months. 
The supposed occurrence of thirty-five or so miracles within such a rela-
tively short period of time is striking. Nor are these miracles merely inci-
dental to the main narrative. The pivotal episode—Jesus’ resurrection—is 
a miracle.
Evidence for the Miraculous
I begin by focusing on evidence for the miraculous (the relevance of this 
will become apparent later). It appears that, as a rule, in order for evidence 
to justify the claim that something miraculous has occurred, the evidence 
needs to be of a much higher standard than that required to justify more 
mundane beliefs. Here is a simple illustration of this point.
The Ted and Sarah Case
Suppose I have two close friends, Ted and Sarah, whom I know to be 
generally sane and trustworthy individuals. Suppose that Ted and Sarah 
now tell me that someone called Bert paid them an unexpected visit in 
their home last night, and stayed a couple of hours drinking tea with 
them. They recount various details, such as topics of conversation, what 
Bert was wearing, and so on. Other things being equal, it is fairly reason-
able for me to believe, solely on the basis of their testimony, that such a 
visit occurred.
But now suppose Ted and Sarah also tell me that shortly before leav-
ing, Bert flew around their sitting room by flapping his arms, died, came 
back to life again, and finished by temporarily transforming their sofa into 
a donkey. Ted and Sarah appear to say these things in all sincerity. In 
fact, they seem genuinely disturbed by what they believe they witnessed. 
They continue to make these claims about Bert even after several weeks of 
cross-examination by me.
Am I justified in believing that Ted and Sarah witnessed miracles? 
Surely not. The fact that Ted and Sarah claim these things happened is not 
nearly good enough evidence. Their testimony presents me with some evi-
dence that miracles were performed in their living room; but, given the ex-
traordinary nature of their claims, I am not yet justified in believing them.
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Notice, incidentally, that even if I am unable to construct a plausible ex-
planation for why these otherwise highly trustworthy individuals would 
make such extraordinary claims—it’s implausible, for example, that Ted 
and Sarah are deliberate hoaxers (for this does not fit at all with what I 
otherwise know about them), or are the unwitting victims of an elaborate 
hoax (why would someone go to such extraordinary lengths to pull this 
trick?)—that would still not lend their testimony much additional cred-
ibility. Ceteris paribus, when dealing with such extraordinary reports—
whether they be about alien abductions or supernatural visitations—the 
fact that it remains blankly mysterious why such reports would be made if 
they were not true does not provide us with very much additional reason 
to suppose that they are true.
Consideration of the Ted and Sarah case suggests something like the 
following moral:
P1	 Where	a	claim’s	justification	derives	solely	from	evidence,	extraordinary	
claims	 (e.g.,	 concerning	 supernatural	 miracles)	 require	 extraordinary	
evidence.	In	the	absence	of	extraordinary	evidence	there	is	good	reason	to	
be sceptical about those claims.
The phrase “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” is as-
sociated particularly with the scientist Carl Sagan.11 By “extraordinary 
evidence” Sagan means, of course, extraordinarily good evidence—evi-
dence much stronger than that required to justify rather more mundane 
claims. The phrase “extraordinary claims” is admittedly somewhat vague. 
A claim need not involve a supernatural element to qualify as “extraor-
dinary” in the sense intended here (the claims that I built a time machine 
over the weekend, or was abducted by aliens, involve no supernatural 
element, but would also count as “extraordinary”). It suffices, for our pur-
poses, to say that whatever “extraordinary” means here, the claim that a 
supernatural miracle has occurred qualifies.
Some theists12 (though of course by no means all) have challenged the 
application of Sagan’s principle to religious miracles, maintaining that 
which claims qualify as “extraordinary” depends on our presuppositions. 
Suppose we begin to examine the historical evidence having presupposed 
that there is no, or is unlikely to be a, God. Then of course Jesus’ miracles 
will strike us as highly unlikely events requiring exceptionally good evi-
dence before we might reasonably suppose them to have occurred. But 
what if we approach the Jesus miracles from the point of view of theism? 
Then that such miraculous events should be a part of history is not, one 
might argue, particularly surprising. But then we are not justified in raising 
11Sagan used it in an episode of the TV series Cosmos called “Encyclopaedia Galactica.” 
Cosmos, PBS, 1980-12-14, No. 12, 01:24 minutes in.
12For examples, see C. S. Lewis, Miracles (new edition) (London: Harper Collins, 2002), 
especially chapter one; also William Lane Craig’s first rebuttal in the transcript of the debate 
with Bart D. Ehrman, “Is There Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus?” available 
on-line at www.freewebs.com/deityofchrist/resurrection-debate-transcript.pdf.
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the evidential bar with respect to such claims. So theists may, after all, be 
justified	 in	accepting	that	such	events	occurred	solely	on	the	basis	of	a	 limited	
amount of testimony, just as they would be the occurrence of other unusual, but 
non-supernatural, events. The application of Sagan’s principle that “extraor-
dinary claims require extraordinary evidence” to the Jesus miracles sim-
ply presupposes, prior to any examination of the evidence, that theism is 
not, or is unlikely to be, true. We might call this response to Sagan’s prin-
ciple the Presuppositions Move.
That there is something awry with the Presuppositions Move, at least as 
it stands, is strongly suggested by the fact that it appears to license those 
of us who believe in Big Foot, psychic powers, the activities of fairies, etc. 
to adopt the same strategy—e.g., we may insist that we can quite reason-
ably accept, solely on the basis of Mary and John’s testimony, that fairies 
danced at the bottom of their garden last night, just so long as we presup-
pose, prior to any examination of the evidence, that fairies exist. Those 
making the Presuppositions Move with respect to religious miracles may 
be prepared to accept this consequence, but I suspect the majority of im-
partial observers will find it a lot to swallow—and indeed will continue to 
consider those who accept testimony of dancing fairies to be excessively 
credulous whether those believers happen to hold fairy-istic presupposi-
tions or not.
I suspect at least part of what has gone wrong here is that, when it 
comes to assessing evidence for the Jesus miracles and other supernatural 
events, we do so having now acquired a great deal of evidence about the unreli-
ability of testimony supposedly supporting such claims. We know—or at least 
ought to know by now—that such testimony is very often very unreliable 
(sightings of ghosts, fairies, and of course, even religious experiences and 
miracles, are constantly being debunked, exposed as fraudulent, etc.). But 
then, armed with this further knowledge about the general unreliability of 
this kind of testimony, even if we do happen to approach such testimony 
with theistic or fairy-istic presuppositions, surely we should still raise the 
evidential bar much higher for eye-witness reports of religious miracles or 
fairies than we do for more mundane claims.13
13It may be said that there is a relevant disanalogy between the application of the Pre-
suppositions Move with respect to religious miracles and to fairies. We have now acquired 
good empirical evidence that there’s no such thing as a fairy. Starting off an assessment 
of the empirical evidence with the presupposition that fairies exist is one thing. Retaining 
that presupposition in the teeth of empirical evidence to the contrary is quite another. The 
Presuppositions Move surely requires that we have come across no body of empirical evidence 
throwing	into	serious	doubt	the	existence	of	what	we	have	been	presupposing	exists. This blocks the 
application of the Presuppositions Move in defence of accepting testimony regarding fairies. 
However, while there’s good empirical evidence that there’s no such thing as a fairy, there’s 
no such evidence against the existence of God. Thus the Move can still be made with respect 
to testimony of religious miracles.
An obvious difficulty with the above suggestion is the evidential problem of evil (for an 
assessment, see my “The Evil God Hypothesis” in Religious Studies 46 [2010], 353–373). Prima 
facie there is good empirical evidence that there is no God. In which case, the above sug-
gestion looks to be no less an obstacle to the use of the Presuppositions Move with respect 
to religious miracles. So, prior to employing the Move, those theists insisting on the above 
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So, my suggestion is that P1 is, prima facie, a fairly plausible principle—
a principle that is applicable to the testimony concerning the miracles of 
Jesus. Note that P1 at least allows for the possibility that we might reason-
ably suppose a miracle has happened. Of course, I do not claim to have 
provided anything like proof of P1. But it does appear fairly accurately to 
reflect one of the ways in which we assess evidence. We do, rightly, set the 
evidential bar much higher for extraordinary claims than we do for more 
mundane claims.
If we turn to the miracle claims made in the New Testament concern-
ing Jesus—including the claim that he was resurrected three days after 
his death—P1 suggests that the evidence required to justify such claims 
would need to be much stronger than that required to justify more mun-
dane claims about ancient history, such as that Caesar crossed the Rubi-
con. That we possess evidence sufficient to justify belief in even one of the 
many supernatural miracles associated with Jesus is clearly questionable. 
There is no consensus among historians about that.
Of course, we should acknowledge that there are differences between 
the historical evidence for the miracles of Jesus and the evidence pro-
vided by Ted and Sarah that miracles were performed in their sitting 
room. For example, we have only two individuals testifying to Bert’s 
miracles, whereas we have all four Gospels, plus Paul, testifying to the 
miracles of Jesus. However, even if we learn that Ted and Sarah were 
joined by three other witnesses whose testimony is then added to their 
own, surely that would still not raise the credibility of their collective 
testimony by very much.
Also note that the evidence supplied by Ted and Sarah is, in certain 
respects, significantly better than the evidence supplied by the New Testa-
ment. For we are dealing directly with the eye-witnesses themselves im-
mediately after the alleged events, rather than having to rely on second- or 
third-hand reports produced two millenia ago, perhaps decades after the 
events in question.
The Contamination Principle
I shall now argue for a second principle.
Let’s return to Ted and Sarah. If they tell me a man called Bert paid 
them an unexpected visit in their home last night, I have every reason to 
believe them. But if they tell me that Bert flew around the room by flap-
ping his arms before dying, coming back to life and turning their sofa into 
a donkey, well then not only am I not justified, solely on the basis of their 
testimony, in believing that these amazing things happened, I can no lon-
ger	be	at	all	confident	that	any	such	person	as	Bert	exists.
None of this is to say we possess good grounds for supposing that Bert 
doesn’t exist. It’s just that we are not yet justified in claiming that he does.
disanalogy will need to come up with an adequate solution to the evidential problem of evil 
(a solution not dependent on the truth of religious miracle claims)—not an easy task.
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Of course, if we are given video footage showing Ted and Sarah wel-
coming someone into their house at just the time Bert supposedly visited, 
well we now have much better grounds for supposing that Bert is real. But 
in the absence of such good, independent evidence, we are not yet justi-
fied in supposing that there is any such person.
These observations suggest something like the following principle:
P2 Where testimony/documents weave together a narrative that combines 
mundane	claims	with	a	significant	proportion	of	 extraordinary	claims,	
and	there	is	good	reason	to	be	sceptical	about	those	extraordinary	claims,	
then there is good reason to be sceptical about the mundane claims, at 
least until we possess good independent evidence of their truth.
We might call this the contamination principle—the thought being that the 
dubious	character	of	the	several	extraordinary	parts	of	a	narrative	ends	up	con-
taminating the more pedestrian parts, rendering them dubious too.
Why does this contamination take place? Because once we know that 
a powerful, false-testimony-producing mechanism (or combination of 
mechanisms) may well have produced a significant chunk of a narrative 
(e.g., the miraculous parts), we can no longer be confident that the same 
mechanism is not responsible for what remains.
Ted and Sarah’s miracle reports, if false, will be the impressive re-
sult of a powerful, false-testimony-producing mechanism. We may not 
know what that mechanism is (hypnotism, L.S.D., or a powerful desire 
to get themselves on daytime TV—who knows?). But, whatever the 
mechanism is, it could, presumably, quite easily also be the source of 
the remainder of their narrative. We can’t, at this stage, be confident that 
it isn’t.
Principle P2 also has some prima facie plausibility. It certainly explains 
why we are not justified in taking Ted and Sarah’s word for it that Bert ex-
ists. However, I don’t doubt that P2 will be challenged, and I will examine 
some likely objections later.
The Bracketing Strategy
Note that if P2, or something like it, is correct, then it rules out a certain ap-
proach to assessing evidence for both the extraordinary and non-extraor-
dinary claims concerning Jesus, an approach we might call “bracketing”.
To make a case for the truth of the non-miraculous parts of Ted and 
Sarah’s testimony, I certainly wouldn’t be justified in saying: “Let’s set to 
one side, for the moment, Ted and Sarah’s claim that Bert performed mir-
acles. We still have the testimony of these two otherwise sane and trust-
worthy individuals that someone called Bert drank tea with them. Under 
other circumstances, we would be justified in taking their word for this. So 
we’re justified in taking their word for it here, too.”
Intuitively, this would be a faulty inference. We’re not yet justified in 
supposing that Bert exists. The fact that a large chunk of Ted and Sarah’s 
testimony involves him performing supernatural miracles does not just 
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slightly reduce the credibility of the rest of the testimony about him—it 
almost entirely undermines it.
It would be particularly foolish of us to attempt to construct a two-
stage case for the miraculous parts of Ted and Sarah’s testimony by 
(i) bracketing the miraculous parts to establish the truth of the non-
miraculous parts, and then (ii) using these supposedly now “firmly es-
tablished facts” as a platform from which to argue for the truth of the 
miraculous parts.
In the same way, we cannot legitimately bracket the miraculous parts of 
the New Testament, and then insist that, as the remaining textual evidence 
for Jesus’ existence is at least as good as the textual evidence we have for 
other ancient figures whose existence is beyond reasonable doubt (e.g., 
Socrates), Jesus’ existence must also be beyond reasonable doubt.
It would also be foolish to try to construct a two part case for Jesus’ mi-
raculous resurrection by (i) bracketing the miraculous parts of the Gospel 
narrative and using what remains to build a case for the truth of certain 
non-miraculous claims (about Jesus’ crucifixion, the empty tomb, and so 
on), and then (ii) using these supposedly now “firmly established facts” 
to argue that Jesus’ miraculous resurrection is what best explains them 
(yet several apologetic works—e.g., Frank Morrison’s Who Moved The 
Stone?14—appear implicitly to rely on this strategy).
A Sceptical Argument
Our two prima facie plausible principles—P1 and P2—combine with cer-
tain plausible empirical claims to deliver a conclusion very few Biblical 
scholars are willing to accept.
Let me stress at the outset that I don’t endorse the following argument. 
I present it, not because I’m convinced it is cogent, but because I believe 
it has some prima facie plausibility, and because it is an argument that any 
historian who believes the available evidence places Jesus’ existence be-
yond reasonable doubt needs to refute.
1. (P1)	Where	a	claim’s	justification	derives	solely	from	evidence,	extraor-
dinary	claims	(e.g.,	concerning	supernatural	miracles)	require	extraor-
dinary	evidence.	In	the	absence	of	extraordinary	evidence	there	is	good	
reason to be sceptical about those claims.
2. There is no extraordinary evidence for any of the extraordinary 
claims concerning supernatural miracles made in the New Testa-
ment documents.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), there’s good reason to be sceptical about 
those extraordinary claims.
4. (P2) Where testimony/documents weave together a narrative that com-
bines	 mundane	 claims	 with	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 extraordinary	
14Frank Morrison, Who Moved The Stone? (London: Faber and Faber, 1930).
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claims,	 and	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 be	 sceptical	 about	 those	 extraordi-
nary claims, then there is good reason to be sceptical about the mundane 
claims, at least until we possess good independent evidence of their truth.
5. The New Testament documents weave together a narrative about 
Jesus that combines mundane claims with a significant proportion 
of extraordinary claims.
6. There is no good independent evidence for even the mundane 
claims about Jesus (such as that he existed).
7. Therefore (from 3, 4, 5, and 6), there’s good reason to be sceptical 
about whether Jesus existed.
Notice that this argument is presented in the context of a discussion of 
what it is or is not reasonable to believe on the basis of the historical evi-
dence.15 The argument combines P1 and P2 with three further premises—2, 
5 and 6—concerning the character of the available evidence. These are the 
premises on which historians and Biblical scholars are better qualified 
than I to comment.
Clearly, many historians also accept something like 2 and 5. A signifi-
cant number remain sceptical about the miracle claims made in the New 
Testament, and so they, at least, are clearly not much tempted by the Pre-
suppositions Move outlined above (which involved the suggestion that, 
for those coming to the evidence with Theistic presuppositions, the New 
Testament miracle claims need not, in the relevant sense, qualify as “ex-
traordinary”). Michael Grant, for example, says: “according to the cold 
standard of humdrum fact, the standard to which the student of history is 
obliged to limit himself, these nature-reversing miracles did not happen.”16 
What of premise 6? Well, it is at least controversial among historians to 
what extent the evidence supplied by Josephus and Tacitus, etc. provides 
good, independent evidence for the existence of Jesus. Those texts pro-
vide some non-miracle-involving evidence, of course, but whether it can 
rightly be considered good, genuinely independent evidence remains widely 
debated among the experts.
So, our empirical premises—2, 5 and 6,—have some prima facie plau-
sibility. I suggest 2 and 5 have a great deal of plausibility, and 6 is at the 
very least debatable.
My suspicion is that a significant number of Biblical scholars and histo-
rians (though of course by no means all) would accept something like all 
three empirical premises. If that is so, it then raises an intriguing question: 
why, then, is there such a powerful consensus that those who take a sceptical at-
titude	towards	Jesus’	existence	are	being	unreasonable?
15As noted in my introduction, some maintain that, irrespective of the quality of the his-
torical evidence, we can nevertheless know the truth of scripture non-inferentially, by way 
of the operation of a sensus divinitatis. However, it is the strength of the historical evidence 
that concerns us here.
16Michael Grant, Jesus, 39.
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Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question would be: while 
many Biblical historians accept that the empirical premises have at least a 
fair degree of plausibility, and most would also accept something like P1, 
few would accept P2.
Assessing P2
Are there cogent objections to P2? Presumably, some sort of contamination 
principle is correct, for clearly, in the Ted and Sarah Case, the dubious 
character of the extraordinary, uncorroborated parts of their testimony 
does contaminate the non-extraordinary parts.
However, as an attempt to capture the degree to which testimony con-
cerning the extraordinary can end up undermining the credibility of the 
more mundane parts of a narrative, perhaps P2 goes too far, laying down 
a condition that is too strong?
After all, Alexander the Great was also said to have been involved in 
miracles. Plutarch records that Alexander was miraculously guided across 
the desert by a flock of ravens that waited when Alexander’s army fell 
behind.17 Should the presence of such extraordinary claims lead us to con-
demn everything Plutarch’s has to say about Alexander as unreliable? Ob-
viously not. As Michael Grant notes:
That there was a growth of legend round Jesus cannot be denied, and it 
arose very quickly. But there had also been a rapid growth of legend around 
pagan figures like Alexander the Great; and yet nobody regards him as 
wholly mythical and fictitious.18
However, these observations should not lead us to abandon P2. For P2 
does not require that we be sceptical Alexander’s existence. The miracu-
lous claims made by Plutarch about Alexander constitute only a small part 
of his narrative. Moreover, regarding the miracle of the ravens, it’s not 
even clear that we are dealing with a supernatural miracle, rather than 
some honestly misinterpreted natural phenomenon. Further, and still 
more importantly, there’s good, independent evidence that Alexander ex-
isted and did many of the things Plutarch reports (including archeological 
evidence of the dynasties left in his military wake).
So the inclusion of a couple of miraculous elements in some of the evi-
dence we have about Alexander is not much of a threat to our knowledge 
about him—and P2 does not suggest otherwise. The same is true when it 
comes to other figures about whom supernatural claims were made, such 
as Socrates (about whom we have non-miracle involving testimony pro-
vided by Plato, Xenophon, etc.) and Julius Caesar (about whom we have 
both non-miracle-involving testimony and other historical evidence). 
The problem with the textual evidence for Jesus’ existence is that most of 
the details we have about him come solely from documents in which the 
17Plutarch’s Alexander	“The	Great” is on-line at http://www.e-classics.com/ALEXANDER.htm.
18Michael Grant, Jesus, 200.
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miraculous constitutes a significant part of what is said about Jesus, where 
many of these miracles (walking on water, etc.) are unlikely to be merely 
misinterpreted natural phenomena, and where it is at least questionable 
whether we possess any good, independent non-miracle-involving evi-
dence of his existence.
An Objection
Here is a different suggestion as to how P2 might be challenged. Suppose 
we engage in a survey of similar figures about whom a great many miracle 
claims are made. We discover that, in the vast majority of cases, when we 
peel back the onionskin layers of mythology, there’s an actual historical 
person at the core. If that were established, then we might generalize, con-
cluding that there’s probably an historical figure lying at the heart of the 
Jesus mythology too. The fact that many miracle claims are made about 
Jesus shouldn’t lead us to question his existence.
But this raises the question—would such a survey reveal that such nar-
ratives almost always have a real person at their core?
Clearly, historical figures do sometimes rapidly become the focus of 
many miracle claims. Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930 to 
1974, is an historical figure around whom an astonishingly rich miracle-
involving mythology developed even within his own lifetime. If such a 
mythology could quickly build up around Selassie, then presumably it 
could also have built up around an historical Jesus.19
However, when we peel back the layers of mythology surrounding 
other figures, such as Jon Frum, figurehead of the cargo-cult religions 
that developed in the 1930s on the islands of Tanna and Vanuatu, it is not 
clear that there is any historical core.20 Not only are the various amazing 
claims about Frum not true, it appears quite likely that there was never 
any such person. Other mythic narratives, e.g., concerning Hercules, 
also appear to have no historical figure at their core. It is not obviously 
a rule that mythical narratives into which are woven a large propor-
tion of miracle claims are, in most cases, built around real people rather 
than mythic characters. So, while such a case for rejecting P2 might per-
haps be developed, the prospects do not seem, at this point, particularly 
promising.
The Decontamination Objection
Another challenge to P2 would be to insist that while many unsubstanti-
ated and extraordinary claims within a narrative might contaminate even 
the mundane parts of the narrative, rendering them dubious too, inde-
pendent confirmation of several mundane parts might serve, as it were, to 
decontaminate the remaining mundane parts.
19A point made by Edmund Standing in Against Mythicism: A Case for the Plausibility of a 
Historical Jesus, on-line at http://www.butterfliesandwheels.com/articleprint.php?num=378.
20For more information on Frum see, e.g., http://www.nthposition.com/thelastcargo.php.
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So, for example, while the New Testament narrative combines both ex-
traordinary and mundane claims, it also includes other mundane claims 
about him for which we do have good independent evidence. For exam-
ple, the narrative makes claims about the existence and position of Pontius 
Pilate, claims for which there is independent evidence. If enough of these 
mundane claims were independently confirmed, wouldn’t that effectively 
decontaminate the testimony regarding at least the mundane claims about 
Jesus—such as that he existed, visited certain places, said certain things, 
was condemned to death by Pilate, and so on?
I don’t believe so. Suppose that in the Ted and Sarah case, Ted and Sar-
ah’s testimony includes various mundane details such as that Bert sat in a 
large grey armchair, stroked their cat Tiddles, drank tea out of a blue mug, 
and so on. On entering Ted and Sarah’s house, we are able to confirm that 
Ted and Sarah do indeed possess a grey armchair, a blue mug, and a cat 
called Tiddles who likes being stroked. Would this effectively decontami-
nate Ted and Sarah’s testimony concerning at least the existence of Bert 
and other mundane claims made about him, such as that he talked about 
the weather and wore a red bow tie?
I think not. Surely Ted and Sarah’s inclusion of the extraordinary and 
unverified details that Bert flew around by flapping his arms, died, came 
back to life again and temporarily transformed their sofa into a donkey 
continues to render even the mundane claims made about Bert highly 
dubious. Dreams and hallucinations typically involve various aspects of 
reality, including people and places. Works of extraordinary fiction often 
locate their fictional characters in real settings and may even have them 
interact with real people. False witnesses typically weave true material 
into their testimony. So, once we suspect that parts of a narrative (the 
extraordinary parts) are the result of deception, hallucination or some 
other false-narrative-producing mechanism, the discovery that some 
mundane parts of the narrative are true hardly serves to decontaminate 
the remaining mundane material. Because both true and false mundane 
details are by no means unexpected within such narratives, the discov-
ery that several mundane parts are true is hardly a secure basis for sup-
posing that much or all of the remaining mundane narrative is likely to 
be true.
Other Reasons for Rejecting P2
Historians may reject P2 on other grounds. They may suggest that there 
are particular features of textual evidence that can rightly lead us to be 
confident about the truth of some of the non-miraculous claims, even if 
many uncorroborated miracle claims are also made. Several criteria have 
been suggested for considering several of the non-miraculous claims 
about Jesus to be established beyond reasonable doubt by the New Testa-
ment documents.
The three most popular criteria are the criterion of multiple attestation, 
the criterion of embarrassment, and the criterion of discontinuity.
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The	Criterion	of	Multiple	Attestation
Several historians (such as Michael Grant and John Meier) suggest that 
the fact that a number of different New Testament sources make similar 
claims in different literary forms gives us some reason, at least, to suppose 
these claims are true. C. Leslie Milton goes further—he argues that the 
New Testament gospels draw on three recognised primary sources (Mark, 
Q and L), and concludes that:
If an item occurs in any one of these early sources, it has a presumptive right 
to be considered as probably historical in essence; if it occurs in two . . . that 
right is greatly strengthened, since it means it is supported by two early 
and independent witnesses. If it is supported by three, then its attestation is 
extremely strong.21
Milton provides a list of non-miraculous claims that he believes pass this 
test of “multiple attestation,” insisting they have a “strong claim to his-
toricity on the basis of this particular test, making a solid nucleus with 
which to begin.”22
If we already know that Jesus existed and is likely to have said at 
least some of what he is alleged to have said, this criterion might prove 
useful in determining which attributions are accurate. But what if we 
are unsure whether there was any such person as Jesus? How useful is 
Milton’s criterion then? Consistency between accounts can indicate the 
extent to which their transmission from an original source or sources 
has been reliable, but it cannot indicate whether the source itself is reliable. 
As Grant notes about the homogeneity of the Gospel accounts of the life 
of Jesus:
one must not underestimate the possibility that this homogeneity is only 
achieved because of their employment of common sources, not necessarily 
authentic in themselves.23
The Criterion of Embarrassment
One of the most popular tests applied by historians in attempting to es-
tablish historical facts about Jesus is the criterion of embarrassment. The 
Jesus narrative involves several episodes which, from the point of view of 
early Christians, seem to constitute an embarrassment. C. Leslie Milton 
claims that
those items which the early Church found embarrassing are not likely to be 
the invention of the early Church.24
Milton supposes that reports of Jesus’
21C. Leslie Milton, Jesus: The Fact Behind The Myth (Oxford: A. R. Mowbray and Co., 1975), 82.
22Ibid., 83.
23Michael Grant, Jesus, 203.
24C. Leslie Milton, Jesus, 84.
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attitude to the Sabbath, fasting and divorce (in contradiction to Moses’ au-
thorization of it in certain conditions), his free-and-easy relationships with 
people not regarded as respectable25
all pass this test.
Michael Grant also considers Jesus’ association with outcasts, his proc-
lamation of the imminent fulfilment of the Kingdom of God (which did 
not materialize), and his rejection of his family “because he was beside 
himself” embarrassing to the early Church, and concludes that these at-
tributions are unlikely to be inventions of early evangelists. Meier, too, 
considers the criterion of embarrassment a useful if not infallible crite-
rion. Regarding the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist—which raises the 
puzzle of why the “superior sinless one submits to a baptism meant for 
sinners”26—Meier says,
Quite plainly, the early Church was “stuck with” an event in Jesus’ life that 
it found increasingly embarrassing, that it tried to explain away by vari-
ous means, and that John the Evangelist finally erased from his Gospel. It is 
highly unlikely that the Church went out of its way to create the cause of its 
own embarrassment.27
The criterion of embarrassment is related to a further criterion—that of 
discontinuity (they are related because discontinuity is sometimes a 
source of embarrassment).
The Criterion of Discontinuity
Many historians and Biblical scholars maintain that if a teaching or saying 
attributed to Jesus places him at odds with contemporary Judaism and early 
Christian communities, then we possess grounds for supposing that the at-
tribution is accurate. Again, Jesus’ rejection of voluntary fasting and divorce 
are claimed to pass this test. Historian Norman Perrin considers the criterion 
of discontinuity the fundamental criterion, giving us an assured minimum 
of material with which to begin.28 C. Leslie Milton concurs that this criterion 
gives historians an “unassailable nucleus” of material to work with.29 John 
Meier considers the criterion promising, though he notes that it may place 
undue emphasis on Jesus’ idiosyncracies, “highlighting what was striking 
but possibly peripheral in his message”.30 Are these academics correct in 
supposing that the satisfaction, either singly or jointly, of these criteria by 
the New Testament testimony is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable 
doubt that many of the non-miracle-involving parts, at least, are true?
25Ibid.
26John Meier, Jesus, 168.
27Ibid., 169.
28Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 
1967), 39–43.
29C. Leslie Milton, Jesus, 84.
30John Meier, A Marginal Jew, 173.
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A Closer Look at the Criteria of Embarrassment and Discontinuity
If we know that Jesus existed, the criteria of embarrassment and disconti-
nuity might perhaps provide us with useful tools in determining which of 
his supposed utterances are genuine. But let’s consider, again, to what ex-
tent these criteria are helpful in determining whether there was any such 
person as Jesus in the first place.
It’s suggested that a group of religion-initiators is unlikely to create a 
narrative involving elements likely to prove embarrassing to that religion, 
or which, by being radically out of step with contemporary thinking, are 
likely to prove an obstacle to its being embraced by others. But is this true? 
Consider:
(i) What if the religion-initiators themselves have developed certain 
radical views, views that the religion is itself designed to promote? 
The fact that the radical nature of these views might prove an ob-
stacle to the religion’s success will be irrelevant to the initiators, 
given that promoting those views is actually part of what the religion is 
designed to do. It is, I think, not implausible that if the Jesus story is 
a myth, it is a story developed by myth-makers who had certain 
radical ethical and other views (e.g., the Kingdom of God being 
imminent) that they wanted others to accept. In which case, the 
fact that the Jesus narrative has Jesus saying and doing things that are 
very much out of step with the thinking of his contemporaries is not good 
evidence	that	Jesus	is	a	real,	historical	figure.
(ii) The existence of embarrassing internal tensions or contradic-
tions within a narrative is surely not so unexpected, even if the 
narrative is entirely mythical. We know that when stories are 
fabricated, they do sometimes involve internal tensions or con-
tradictions that are not immediately apparent, only becoming 
an embarrassment for their creator later, when, say, he is under 
cross-examination in the dock. But then the fact that the Jesus 
story contains such initially unrecognised internal tensions or 
contradictions is surely not particularly good evidence for its 
truth. Indeed, ironically, the fact that a story involves apparent 
internal tensions or contradictions is, under most other circum-
stances, actually taken to indicate that the story isn’t true, not 
that it is true. In reply, it may be said: but some of these tensions 
must have been fairly obvious right from the start (the embar-
rassing tension Meier notes between the baptism story and Jesus’ 
supposed sinless nature might, perhaps, be an example). Why 
would such tensions deliberately be introduced by myth-makers? 
One possible answer is: as a result of compromise. When a myth 
is created, it may well be created to cater to several competing 
interests or interest groups, each with a stake in the outcome. 
The product may be an inevitably, and perhaps fairly obviously, 
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flawed attempt to cater to these conflicting interests within a sin-
gle mythical narrative.
(iii) Is it true that initiators of new religions are unlikely to include in 
their mythical narratives ideas and episodes very much out of step 
with contemporary thinking, and/or likely to prove somewhat em-
barrassing to the religion? I am not sure a survey of new religions 
bares this out. New religions and cults often promote outlandish 
views significantly out of line with contemporary thinking. Con-
sider scientology. Scientology’s initiator, L. Ron Hubbard, appar-
ently taught his ‘advanced’ followers that 75 million years ago, 
Xenu, alien ruler of a “Galactic Confederacy,” brought billions of 
people to Earth in spacecraft shaped like Douglas DC-10 airplanes 
and stacked them around volcanoes which he then blew up with 
hydrogen bombs.31 These preposterous claims predictably pro-
voke much mirth at Scientology’s expense. Hubbard must surely 
have known this would be the case (indeed, perhaps this is why he 
attempted to restrict the information to “advanced” students). Yet 
he nevertheless chose to include them as part of his religion’s core 
(and, I take it, entirely mythical) teaching.
To summarize this section: we are looking at possible reasons for rejecting 
P2. Given the many extraordinary and unsubstantiated claims made about 
Jesus in the New Testament documents, P2 entails that, in the absence of 
any good independent evidence to the contrary, we should be sceptical 
even about his existence. I see, as yet, no reason to abandon this thesis. The 
three criteria examined above—multiple attestation, embarrassment and 
discontinuity—may provide us with useful tools in determining which 
attributions are accurate, once we know that some probably are. But they 
do not, on closer examination, appear to provide us with good reason to 
suppose that Jesus was not mythical in the first place (which is, of course, 
not to say we yet possess good reason to suppose he is mythical).
If you doubt this, then consider a second thought experiment: the case 
of the sixth islander.
The	Case	of	the	Sixth	Islander
Suppose five people are rescued from a large, otherwise uninhabited 
island on which they were shipwrecked ten years previously. The ship-
wrecked party knew that if they survived they would, eventually, be res-
cued, for they knew the island was a nature reserve visited by ecologists 
every ten years.
As the islanders recount their stories, they include amazing tales of a 
sixth islander shipwrecked along with them. This person, they claim, soon 
set himself apart from the others by performing amazing miracles—walk-
ing on the sea, miraculously curing one of the islanders who had died 
31See entry on “Xenu” on wikipedia.
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from a snakebite, conjuring up large quantities of food from nowhere, and 
so on. The mysterious sixth islander also had strikingly original ethical 
views that, while unorthodox, were eventually enthusiastically embraced 
by the other islanders. Finally, several years ago, the sixth islander died, 
but he came back to life three days later, after which he ascended into the 
sky. He was even seen again several times after that.
Let’s add some further details to this hypothetical scenario. Suppose 
that the five islanders tell much the same story about the revered sixth 
member of their party. While differing in style, their accounts are broad-
ly consistent. Indeed, a vivid and forceful portrait of the sixth islander 
emerges from their collective testimony, containing as much detail as, say, 
the Gospel accounts do regarding Jesus.
Interestingly, the stories about the sixth islander also include a number 
of details that are awkward or embarrassing for the remaining islanders. 
Indeed, they all agree that two of the surviving islanders actually betrayed 
and killed the sixth islander. Moreover, some of the deeds supposedly 
performed by the sixth islander are clearly at odds with what the survi-
vors believe about him (for example, while believing the sixth islander 
to be entirely without malice, they attribute to him actions that appear 
deliberately cruel, actions they subsequently have a hard time explaining). 
These are details it seems it could hardly be in their interests to invent.
Such is their admiration for their sixth companion and his unorthodox 
ethical views that the survivors try hard to convince us both that what 
they say is true, and that it is important that we too come to embrace his 
teaching. Indeed, for the rescued party, the sixth islander is a revered cult 
figure, a figure they wish us to revere too.
Now suppose we have, as yet, no good independent evidence for the 
existence of the sixth islander, let alone that he performed the miracles 
attributed to him. What should be our attitude to these various claims?
Clearly, we would rightly be sceptical about the miraculous parts of the 
testimony concerning the sixth islander. Their collective testimony is not 
nearly good enough evidence that such events happened. But what of the 
sixth islander’s existence? Is it reasonable to believe, solely on the basis 
of this testimony, that the sixth islander was at least a real person, rather 
than a delusion, a deliberately invented fiction, or whatever?
Notice that the evidence presented by the five islanders satisfies the 
three criteria discussed above.
First, we have multiple	attestation: not one, but five, individuals claim 
that the sixth islander existed (moreover, note that we are dealing with 
the alleged eye-witnesses themselves, rather than second or third hand re-
ports, so there is no possibility of others having altered the original story, 
as there is in the case of the New Testament testimony).
Secondly, their reports contain details that are clearly highly embarrass-
ing to (indeed, that seriously incriminate) the tellers. This raises the ques-
tion: why would the islanders deliberately include such details in a made-
up story—a story that e.g., is clearly in tension with what they believe 
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about their hero, and which, indeed, also portrays them as murderous 
betrayers?
Thirdly, why would they attribute to the sixth islander unorthodox 
ethical and other views very much discontinuous with accepted wisdom? 
If, for example, the sixth islander is an invention designed to set them up 
as chief gurus of a new cult, would they attribute to their mythical leader 
views unlikely to be easily accepted by others?
There is little doubt that there could have been a sixth islander who said 
and did some of the things attributed to him. But ask yourself: does the col-
lective testimony of the rescued party place the existence of the sixth islander 
beyond reasonable doubt? If not beyond reasonable doubt, is his existence 
something it would at least be reasonable for us to accept? Or would we be 
wiser, at this point, to reserve judgement and adopt a sceptical stance?
A Test of Intuition
What I am presenting here is, in effect, a philosophical thought-experiment 
of the sort standardly employed in philosophy (such as e.g., Putnam’s 
twin-Earth thought experiment,32 and trolley problems designed to test 
ethical positions). Such experiments involve an appeal to our philosophi-
cal intuitions. What, intuitively, is the right answer to the above questions?
It strikes me as pretty obvious that the existence of the sixth islander 
certainly has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it 
seems obvious to me that—despite the fact that the three criteria of multiple at-
testation,	embarrassment	and	discontinuity	are	all	clearly	satisfied—we are jus-
tified in taking a rather sceptical attitude towards the claims that any such 
a person existed. Yes, it is possible that there was a sixth islander. If we 
had independent grounds for supposing that the sixth islander existed, 
such as evidence from a ship’s log, or a large number of witnesses from a 
neighbouring island who reported seeing six islanders, then it would be 
reasonable to suppose that the sixth islander existed (whether or not he 
was a miracle worker).
But, while I acknowledge that it might even, at this point, be slightly 
more reasonable than not to suppose there was a sixth islander, surely we 
would be wise to reserve judgement on whether or not any such person 
existed. We should remain sceptical.
In short, in the case of the sixth islander, our three criteria produce the 
wrong verdict, and P2 actually produces the right verdict.
Most of those to whom I have presented this thought experiment have 
had similar intuitions to my own (certainly, all the non-Christians have). 
Of course, appeal to thought experiment and philosophical intuition is by 
no means an infallible guide to truth.33 But I suggest that we have here a 
32See Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” in Language, Mind and Knowledge, ed. 
K. Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 131–193.
33See, for example, Daniel Dennett’s “Intuition Pumps,” Minds and Machines 16 (2006): 
81–86, and recent work on trolley problem intuitions in e.g., Peter Unger, Living High and 
Letting	Die	(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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prima face powerful objection to the suggestion that our three criteria, either sin-
gly	or	in	conjunction,	place	Jesus’	existence	beyond	reasonable	doubt.
Notice that, even if your intuitions happen not to coincide with mine 
regarding the sixth islander, if the intuitions of the majority do—and 
that is my impression—that fact, by itself, would still raise a prima facie 
difficulty for the suggestion that the New Testament documents alone 
suffice firmly to establish the existence of an historical Jesus. It would 
be interesting to establish with more precision just how the philosophi-
cal intuitions of Christians and non-Christians line up regarding this 
thought-experiment, and, if they significantly differ, to investigate why 
that should be so.
Of course, it is possible that we might yet identify some relevant dif-
ference between the New Testament testimony about Jesus and the testi-
mony about the sixth islander that explains why, if we are not justified in 
supposing that the sixth islander exists, we are justified, solely on the basis 
of the New Testament documents, in supposing that Jesus exists. Identify-
ing such a difference is a challenge that those who take that view need to 
meet. Here is one suggestion.
Does	the	Cultural	Difference	Matter?
Our hypothetical islanders are, we have been assuming, contemporary 
Westerners, who are not usually in the habit of concocting miracle stories. 
However, other cultures are. Arguably, first century Palestine was such 
a culture. So, while the fact that many miracles are attributed to the sixth 
islander should rightly lead us to be sceptical about his existence, the fact 
that many miracles are attributed to Jesus should not lead us to be scepti-
cal about his existence.
We can adjust our thought experiment to test this suggestion. Suppose 
our islanders are not, in fact, Westerners, but come from a tribal culture 
known to be fond of myth-making.
Now ask yourself: does this really make the existence of the sixth is-
lander significantly more likely? Some may argue that this cultural dif-
ference increases the probability that the islanders do sincerely believe at 
least the non-extraordinary parts of their story, and so lowers the prob-
ability that they just made those parts up, thus increasing the probability 
that those parts are true.
But why suppose it’s now significantly more likely that islanders do be-
lieve even the non-extraordinary parts of their story? We know that some-
times, when a myth is invented, it is made up about a real person—as in 
the Haile Selassie case. However, other times even the central character is 
made up, as appears to be true of John Frum.
So, while we may know, given this culture’s penchant for myth-mak-
ing, that this might be a Haile Selassie type case with a real person at its 
core, surely we cannot be particularly confident that it isn’t a John Frum 
type case with no such historical core, particularly given the very large 
proportion of extraordinary claims woven into the narrative.
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Final	Worry	re.	P2:	What	is	a	“Significant	Proportion”?
A final worry worth addressing concerning P2 focuses on the expression 
“a significant proportion of extraordinary claims.” What is a “significant 
proportion”? Doesn’t the hazy and impressionistic character of this phrase 
undermine the practical applicability of P2?
I don’t believe so. Of course the expression is vague. I also acknowledge 
that there are some subtleties concerning contamination that deserve fur-
ther unpacking. For example, it is surely not just the ratio of extraordinary 
events to non-extraordinary events that is relevant so far as contamination 
is concerned. The character of the events also matters. Reports of super-
natural events that might easily turn out to be misidentified natural phe-
nomena (such as Alexander’s guiding flock of ravens) presumably have 
less of a contaminatory effect (for it is less likely, then, that we are dealing 
with the product of an exceptionally powerful false-testimony-producing 
mechanism or mechanisms such as outright fabrication or fraud rather 
than, say, mere coincidence or an optical illusion). Extraordinary events 
that are not incidental episodes (e.g., a virgin birth tacked on to the begin-
ning of a narrative) but largely integral to the main narrative presumably 
also have a stronger contaminatory effect, for it is less likely that they are 
merely later adornments to an existing non-miracle involving, and thus 
far more trustworthy, piece of testimony.
Nevertheless, the New Testament testimony regarding Jesus man-
ages to pack in the region of thirty-five miracles into a total of just a 
few weeks or months out of something like the last three years of Jesus’ 
life. Unlike Alexander’s guiding flock of birds, many of these miracles 
do seem unlikely to be merely misinterpreted natural phenomena. And 
many are integral to the main narrative (as I say, the pivotal episode 
is a miracle). It seems to me, then, that the miracle-involving parts of 
the Jesus testimony must have a fairly powerful contaminatory effect on 
what remains.
Indeed, suppose the testimony concerning the sixth islander covers a 
few weeks or months out of the three years the mystery islander suppos-
edly spent with the witnesses, that the same number of miracle claims 
are made about him as are made about Jesus, and that the miracles are 
of much the same character. If the miraculous parts of our five witnesses’ 
testimony concerning the sixth islander would lead us to be rather scepti-
cal about whether there was a sixth islander, shouldn’t the miraculous 
parts of the Jesus testimony lead us to equally sceptical about whether 
there was any such person? If there is contamination sufficient to throw 
the existence of the miracle-doer into question in the former case, why not 
in the latter?
So while P2 is vague and may require some fine-tuning, it seems to me 
unlikely that even an appropriately refined version will allow us to say 
that the New Testament testimony does, after all, place the existence of 
Jesus beyond reasonable doubt.
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Conclusions
This paper, while relevant to Biblical history, is essentially philosophical 
in nature. My focus has not, primarily, been on the historical evidence 
concerning Jesus, but rather on the principles by which that evidence is, or 
should be, assessed.
I draw three conclusions. The first conclusion is a moral: it is important 
not	 to	 overlook	 the	 effects	 of	 contamination—of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 dubious	
character of the uncorroborated miraculous parts of a piece of testimony can ren-
der what remains dubious too. Many historians believe the New Testament 
documents alone provide us with testimony (even if second- or third-
hand) sufficient to render the claim that there was an historical Jesus at 
least pretty reasonable, and perhaps even sufficient to place it beyond any 
reasonable doubt. We should concede that, other things being equal, testi-
mony is something we do, rightly, trust. As Richard Bauckham, Professor 
of New Testament Studies, points out in Jesus And The Eye-Witnesses: The 
Gospels As Eye-Witness Testimony:
An irreducible feature of testimony as a form of utterance is that it has to be 
trusted. This need not mean that it asks to be trusted uncritically, but it does 
mean that testimony should not be treated as credible only to the extent that 
it can be independently verified.34
Bauckham immediately concludes that the:
Gospels understood as testimony are the entirely appropriate means of ac-
cess to the historical reality of Jesus.35
As already noted, Biblical historian C. Leslie Milton also stresses the pre-
sumptive right of testimony to be trusted. About the early Gospel sources, 
he says:
If an item occurs in any one of these early sources, it has a presumptive right 
to be considered as probably historical in essence; if it occurs in two . . . that 
right is greatly strengthened, since it means it is supported by two early 
and independent witnesses. If it is supported by three, then its attestation is 
extremely strong.36
I would agree that such testimony would have such a presumptive right, 
were	 it	 not	 for	 the	 significant	 proportion	 of	miracle	 claims	woven	 throughout	
its fabric. The Gospels are littered with around thirty-five miracle claims, 
many of a very dramatic nature. Nor are these miracle claims inciden-
tal to the Gospel narrative. To a large extent, the miracle stories are the 
narrative. Whether or not principle P2 is entirely right, it does seem that 
some sort of contamination principle must be correct, and such a principle 
34Richard Bauckham, Jesus And The Eye-Witnesses: The Gospels As Eye-Witness Testimony 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William Eerdman Publishing, 2006), 5.
35Ibid.
36C. Leslie Milton, Jesus, 82.
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might well then constitute a serious threat to such presumptions about the 
reliability of New Testament testimony.
The second conclusion I draw concerns the three criteria of multiple at-
testation, embarrassment and discontinuity, criteria widely used to justify 
the claim that the New Testament documents alone suffice to establish 
firmly the truth of various Biblical claims, such as that Jesus existed. On 
closer examination, these three criteria do not appear (either singly or jointly), 
to establish, by themselves, a core of material within the New Testament testimo-
ny	that	we	can	justifiably	consider	“assured”	(Perrin),	an	“unassailable	nucleus”	
(C. Leslie Milton)	or	“unlikely	to	be	inventions	of	early	evangelists”	(Grant). 
We tested these criteria by means of a thought-experiment: the case of 
the sixth islander. The testimony concerning the sixth islander’s existence 
clearly meets all three criteria, yet his existence, it seems to me, is by no 
means firmly established. It is entirely possible that Jesus existed and was 
crucified. I am not promoting, and indeed remain sceptical about, the 
claim that the Jesus story is entirely mythical. However, I have questioned 
the extent to which the New Testament documents provide us with good 
evidence for the existence and crucifixion of Jesus. They provide some 
evidence, of course. They may even make Jesus’ existence a little more 
probable than not. But do they, by themselves, provide us with evidence 
sufficient to establish the existence of an historical Jesus beyond any rea-
sonable doubt? I don’t yet see that they do.
The contamination principle, P2, is a prima facie plausible principle that, 
in conjunction with other prima face plausible premises, delivers the con-
clusion that, in the absence of good independent evidence for the exis-
tence of an historical Jesus, we are justified in remaining sceptical about 
the existence of such a person. We have looked at several objections to 
P2, including the suggestion that the joint satisfaction of the criteria of 
multiple attestation, embarrassment and discontinuity is sufficient to jus-
tify belief in at least some of the non-extraordinary claims made in the 
Gospels, such as that Jesus existed. However, as noted above, when we 
test this suggestion against the hypothetical case of the sixth islander, the 
three criteria appear (to me, at least) to give the wrong verdict, and P2 to 
give the right verdict. My third conclusion is that P2 has not, so far as I can 
see, been successfully challenged.37
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